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ABSTRACT 
 
 
WHY DO STATES APOLOGIZE? A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF INTER-STATE 
APOLOGIES FOR WAR-CRIMES 
 
 
MOHAMMAD MOHSIN HUSSAIN 
 
Master’s Thesis, June 2018 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Fac.Mem. Kerim Can Kavaklı 
 
There are many cases of historical crimes between countries that continue to hurt inter-state 
relations. Apologies for historical crimes is one such post-conflict phenomenon that has 
received a lot of attention by scholars from various fields. However, studies investigating 
the conditions under which states apologize for historical crimes have not moved beyond a 
few country-specific cases i.e. German and Japanese apologies for World War II. My thesis 
aims to address this gap using a new dataset on which states apologized for war-crimes 
committed in the 20th century, and when these apologies were offered. In particular, I focus 
on economic incentives, leader ideology and culpability to explain inter-state apologies. I 
find that states which commit the most severe violations are more likely to apologize, among 
other factors. However, factors, such as the prospect of bilateral trade and shared religious 
preferences between two states are not related to apologies. Overall, the goal of my thesis is 
to clarify the circumstances under which states are able to move beyond historical crimes 
that harm their bilateral relations. 
 
Keywords: Economic incentives, Leader Ideology and Leader Culpability 
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ÖZET 
 
DEVLETLER NEDEN ÖZÜR DİLER? SAVAŞ SUÇLARINDAN DOLAYI 
DEVLETLER ARASI DİLENEN ÖZÜRLERİN SİSTEMATİK ÇALIŞMASI 
 
MOHAMMAD MOHSIN HUSSAIN 
 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Haziran 2018 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Öğr Uyesi Kerim Can Kavaklı 
 
Tarihi pek çok suç, ülkelerin kendi aralarındaki ilişkileri kötü etkilemeye devam etmektedir. 
Tarihi suçlar için özür dilenmesi, çatışma sonrası dönemler için çeşitli alanlardan pek çok 
araştırmacının ilgisini çekmiştir. Ancak, hangi şartlar altında, hangi devletlerin işledikleri 
suçlar için özür dilemesinin araştırılması bir kaç vakaa çalışmasından (Almanya, ve 
Japonya'nın). Dünya Savaşı için diledikleri özürler) öteye geçmemiştir. Bu bağlamda '20. 
yüzyılda işlenen savaş suçlarından dolayı' dilenen özürler üzerine oluşturduğum yeni veri 
seti ile bu alandaki boşlukları doldurmayı amaçlıyorum. Özellikle, ekonomik teşvikler, lider 
ideolojisi, ve kabahat unsurlarına odaklanar devletler arası özrü incelemekteyim. 
Bulgularımdan birisi, özellikle en şiddetli savaş suçu ihlallerini uygulayan devletler, başka 
faktörlerin yanı sıra daha özür dilemeye yatkın olmalarıdır. Fakat, ikili ticaret ve iki devlet 
arasında paylaşılan dini tercihler özür dilenmesiyle ilişkilendirilememiştir. Genel itibariyle 
tezimin amacı hangi koşullarda ikili ilişkileri etkileyen tarihi savaş suçlardan özür 
dilendiğini tespit etmektir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ekonomik teşvikler, Lider İdeolojisi ve Kabahat Unsurlarına Odaklanar  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
  Massive human rights violations take place in almost every war. These atrocities create long-
lasting grievances and, unless they are addressed, poison relations between states. Consider 
the case of Sino-Japanese relations, which remain tense as China holds grievances against 
Japan for the Nanking massacre. Chinese officials have regularly blamed Japan for rape 
during the Nanking massacre of 1938, where Japan committed several other mass atrocities. 
In 2012, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged complaints against Japanese 
politicians who denied the Nanking Massacre (BBC, 2012).  As a result, Sino-Japanese 
relations remain tense to this day, as China demands acknowledgement, apologies, and 
reparations for past Japanese war crimes (BBC, 2012). 
Sometimes, actors address grievances by apologizing for past crimes. For example, Germany 
has addressed grievances for its Nazi past by apologizing repeatedly to its victims. On the 
other hand, there are countries, such as USA, which refuse to apologize. U.S.A has never 
issued an apology for atrocities, such as the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan. 
Moreover, actors apologize to some actors, but not others. For instance, Germany apologized 
to Israel for the Holocaust, but not to Russia for World War-II crimes. There are also cases, 
where an actor apologized early to one victim, but much later to another victim. A good 
example is again Germany, which apologized to Poland in 1970, but apologized to Greece 
in 2015. These cases raise the question: What determines if and when a state apologizes to 
another state for past war crimes? 
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In my thesis, I ask these questions in relation to inter-state conflict. My main research 
question is, “When and why do states apologize for past crimes in inter-state wars?”  This 
thesis intends to make two contributions; first, I offer a theoretical framework, which 
accounts for when states apologize for past crimes. Second, I conduct a statistical analysis 
of when inter-state apologies are offered. To my knowledge, no systematic study on inter-
state apologies exists. My study investigates when and why states apologize both 
theoretically and empirically.  
To investigate when states apologize, I theorize that leaders of perpetrator states compare 
the costs and benefits of apologizing and apologize when the benefits are relatively high. My 
theory of apologies invites discussion into possible benefits and costs of apologizing. 
Possible benefits include trade benefits, and reduced stigma for the perpetrator-state. On the 
other hand, possible costs include financial costs of reparations and the psychological or 
ideological burden of accepting responsibility for inter-state crimes. In my thesis, I create 
and use empirical measures of these associated costs and benefits and study their effect on a 
leader’s decision to apologize. In addition, I also consider several alternative explanations 
for why states apologize. One alternative explanation is that apologies are extracted from 
defeated states. Another alternative explanation for why states apologize is the existence of 
shared religious and cultural norms between the perpetrator-state and victim-state. Finally, I 
also explore the argument that democratic or jointly democratic states are more likely to 
apologize than others.  
My findings show that leader characteristics, such as a leader’s ideology and his/her lack of 
association with war-crimes explain inter-state apologies in tandem with state and systemic-
level characteristics. This suggests an interplay between domestic, state, and systemic-level 
characteristics for inter-state apologies. However, some state-level characteristics, such as 
shared religious values between states do not explain state apologies. I also observe some 
interesting state-level trends: I find that democratic states are less likely to apologize when 
the victim-state is not a democracy. I also find that states apologize to states with larger 
economies. At the systemic level, I find that during the Cold War era, states were more likely 
to apologize. Additionally, having common allies influences leaders’ decision to apologize, 
but only in the post-1990s’ era. 
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Why are these findings important? These findings hold implications for policy: knowing 
which leader incentives matter allows third-parties to find leverage, which can push actors 
towards reconciliation. In doing so, third parties can influence the incumbent’s decision to 
apologize, and settle past grievances with other countries. My research also suggests that 
similarity of geopolitical preferences increases chances of an inter-state apology. Third-
parties in international conflicts can influence leaders to recognize such similarities and 
encourage alliances by incentivizing bilateral and multilateral cooperation.   
The thesis proceeds as follows. In the second chapter, I will conduct a literature review on 
political apologies. In the third chapter, I present my theory of inter-state apologies and 
introduce testable hypotheses. In the fourth chapter, I present my data and research design. 
Findings of my study are presented in the fifth chapter. Finally, the thesis concludes with a 
brief discussion on areas for future research. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
I use this section of my thesis to explore several streams of literature, which are relevant to 
my study on inter-state apologies for past crimes.1 In doing so, I highlight the importance of 
studying political apologies, how the current literature has investigated political apologies, 
and why and how my study on inter-state apologies contributes to the relevant literature. 
This scholarly discussion enriches my theory and hypotheses for exploring inter-state 
apologies.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 There exists a huge literature on interpersonal apologies, which I exclude from the literature review. For a full review, see De 
Cremer et al, 2011. 
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2.1 POLITICAL APOLOGIES: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
One such post-conflict phenomenon, which has contributed to reconciliation between states 
is political apologies. There exists a rich literature on political apologies, which spans across 
several fields of social science.2 In the realm of International Relations, case studies on 
German and Japanese apologies have explored the consequences of apologies on diplomatic 
and economic relations (Lind, 2008; Wolfe, 2014). In the German case, these scholars found 
that the international community has welcomed their apologies for World War II atrocities. 
As a result, Germany’s bilateral relations have improved (Lind, 2008). On the other hand, 
Japanese World War II apologies were met unfavorably by their recipients and resulted in a 
national backlash in Japan (Lind, 2008). However, these studies on state apologies do not go 
beyond a few country-specific cases, and therefore, cannot be generalized to other cases of 
interest.  
Scholars have also studied the consequences of political apologies offered by leaders to their 
public (Cunningham, 1999). These studies contend that the 1990s was an era of ‘national 
self-reflexivity’, as leaders from various countries apologized to disenfranchised 
communities for past injustices. Cases which have received the most scholarly attention in 
this field are: Clinton’s apology to African-Americans for slavery, and Canada’s apology for 
crimes committed in Indian residential schools (Cunningham, 1999).   
In sum, the existing literature on political apologies has not explored inter-state apologies 
for past crimes.  Moreover, scholars studying these topics have focused on the consequences 
rather than causes behind political apologies.  
Political apologies have also been discussed in the context of political philosophy and 
political theory, where scholars have discussed the power of political apologies, why states 
ought to apologize for past crimes, and the role state apologies can play for improving 
                                                          
2 Scholars who have studied political apologies: Lind (2008), Gibney and Rostrom (2001), Nobles (2008), Ho (2005), Wolfe 
(2014), Rivera (2008), Adler-Nissen (2014). Penic et al (2016), Barkan (2006), Cunningham (1998; 2001), Espindola (2013), 
Corn-Tassel and Holder (2008), Zarakol (2010), Wenzel et al (2017), Smith (2008), Harris et al (2006), Mihai (2013), Mihai and 
Thaler (2014), Auerbach (2005), Borneman (2005) and Marrus (2007), Wagner and Stack (2012), Doosje et al (2006), Zaiser and 
Giner-Sorolla (2013), Frantz and Bennigson (2004), Leunissen et al (2011), Lewicki et al (2016) and De Cremer et al (2011). 
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treatment of disenfranchised communities (Mihai 2013; Wagner, 2000). While insightful, 
this scholarly discussion is about why states ought to apologize, rather than why states 
apologize. By investigating why states apologize empirically, I intend to bridge normative 
and empirical work on inter-state apologies.  
Furthermore, some conflict scholars have investigated the circumstances in which groups 
affected by collective violence experience collective guilt (Penic et al, 2016). These scholars 
found that groups which experience collective violence, are more prone to guilt in the 
conflict’s aftermath. Feelings of guilt can push people to apologize for atrocities. 
Nevertheless, findings from these studies on collective guilt are limited to communal conflict 
and offer no implications for apologies exchanged at the inter-state level. I thus explore ex-
ante implications of inter-state apologies in my study. For instance, I explore the prospect of 
alleviating guilt via apologizing. I achieve this by exploring whether leaders from states, 
which have committed severe war crimes are more likely to apologize.   
Recent work from the field of Political Psychology has proven relevant for our study, where 
scholars have explored collective apologies in experimental settings (Wenzel et al, 2017). 
Scholars from this field have found that timing of an apology affects how recipients evaluate 
the apology. These studies however, mainly explore the consequences of collective 
apologies and are limited to the individual level of analysis. My study explores apologies at 
the domestic, state and systemic level, and thus broadens the scope of analysis for apologies.    
If there is one consensus shared by scholars studying political apologies, it is that when states 
apologize, they reap political benefits following their act of contrition (see Nobles, 2008). 
Political benefits, such as votes from disenfranchised groups have been identified by these 
scholars. However, not much has been said about which political benefits matter for leaders 
considering an inter-state apology. Moreover, the link between domestic incentives and 
foreign policy has not been explored for apologies. My study addresses this gap by exploring 
political benefits of apologies in a systematic matter. Also, I reveal how leader incentives at 
home influence apologizing for inter-state crimes. 
Countries which do not apologize, also risk poisoning their international reputation. Indeed, 
some scholars of international relations have shown that countries which remain 
unapologetic for past crimes, risk stigmatization at the international level (Adler-Nissen, 
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2014). Previous literature on this issue has explored the Turkish case, where Turkey’s 
unapologetic stance towards Armenian genocide has hurt its bilateral relations (Nobles, 
2008). Scholars have also identified Turkey’s refusal to apologize for the Armenian 
Genocide as an impediment to its EU accession process (Zarakol, 2010).3 Additionally, the 
literature stigmatization has also focused on which strategies states use to deal with their 
stigmatization. Rivera (2008) for example, found that Croatia deals with its stigmatization 
by feigning ignorance of its violent past. In contrast, others, such as Germany and Austria 
have dealt with their stigmatization by embracing their violent past and apologizing for their 
war crimes (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Lind, 2008; Rivera, 2008).  
But, if stigmas are costly for international relations, why do some states address this stigma 
via apologizing, whereas others do not? In my study of interstate apologies, I address this 
puzzle by exploring material, psychological and reputational costs leaders of perpetrator-
states of apologizing. In doing so, I intend to show that leaders which face these costs are 
less likely to apologize. Overall, this would explain why some states deal with stigma 
associated with international crimes via apologizing, whereas others choose not to.  
 
 
 
2.2 RESEARCH OF INTER-STATE CONFLICT 
 
 
My discussion of the political apologies’ literature shows that the circumstances in which 
states apologize for past crimes remain unexplored. For our purpose, some studies on inter-
state conflict, offer insight into why states might be reluctant in admitting to inter-state 
crimes. In her study on why states no longer declare war, Fazal (2013) argued that states are 
subject to high material costs e.g. reparations when held accountable for war crimes. To 
avoid these costs, states in recent years have stopped declaring war to evade accountability 
                                                          
3 See also the European Commission’s (2006) report, which lists an apology for Armenian Genocide as one of the requirements 
for Turkey’s EU accession.  
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under international law (Fazal, 2013). In another study, Fazal (2013) found that the same 
material costs associated with accountability prevent states from concluding peace treaties 
in the aftermath of conflict. I find these studies useful for my investigation of inter-state 
apologies, as they suggest why states might find it difficult to offer apologies for past abuses. 
However, these studies offer no implications for why some states apologize for past crimes, 
despite the cost of accountability under international law. 
Scholars have also shown that economic interdependence between states reduces conflict 
(Gartzke et al, 2001; Gasiorowski, 1986; Keohane, 1986). In addition, several studies have 
shown that democracies are less likely to risk conflict with each other (Gartzke, 1998; Maoz 
and Russet, 1993; Mesquita et al, 1999; Owen, 1994).  
But, what makes states apologize for atrocities committed during inter-state conflict? I argue 
that this research on inter-state conflict has implications for not just peace, but also inter-
state reconciliation. Currently, these explanations have not been used to investigate why 
states apologize. My study on inter-state apologies incorporates this research to study when 
and why states apologize for war crimes.    
In sum, no comprehensive study on inter-state apologies exists, and therefore, my study is 
novel in that regard. Using my newly constructed dataset of ‘Inter-State Apologies for Inter-
State War Crimes’, I explore the universe of inter-state apologies in a systematic manner. 
My main argument is that leaders of perpetrator-states apologize when the political and 
economic benefits are higher than the social and psychological costs of admitting to past 
atrocities. Overall, my thesis reveals the circumstances in which states are willing to move 
beyond past crimes and achieve reconciliation. The next chapter of my thesis presents my 
theory and hypotheses for investigating inter-state apologies for past crimes.  
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
 
In this section, I present the theoretical framework for exploring inter-state apologies. My 
theory states that leaders of perpetrator-states i.e. leaders of states responsible for the crimes, 
compare the costs and benefits of apologizing. Things that make benefits larger raise the 
likelihood of apologies. Conversely, things that make costs larger reduce the likelihood of 
apologies. Using this theory, I expect the leader to apologize when the benefits of 
apologizing outweigh the costs. 
Why do leaders matter for apologies? Previous research on political linkages have shown 
that leader incentives matter in domestic and international politics. For instance, Croco 
(2011) has shown how a leader’s association with war outcomes can influence his/her 
decision to continue unsuccessful inter-state wars. Similarly, Putnam (1998) revealed that 
leaders play a vital role in domestic and international negotiation. Other notable scholars, 
such as Mesquita and Siverson (1995) have revealed how leader dynamics, such as re-
election prospects and presidential terms, influence a state’s foreign policy.  
In similar vein, I argue that leader incentives matter for apologizing. I produce testable 
hypotheses to explore my leader-centric theory of apologies. Each hypothesis explores either 
a benefit or a cost of apologizing for leaders.  
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3.1 SEVERITY OF VIOLATIONS AND APOLOGIES 
 
 
Previous research on interpersonal apologies has shown that perpetrators often apologize 
when they feel guilty about their past transgressions (Zaiser and Giner-Sorolla, 2013). As 
such, feelings of shame become a psychological cost for the perpetrator, which is 
exacerbated when the crimes are severe (Nadler and Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel et al., 2009). 
Thus, the act of apologizing becomes the perpetrator’s only means of restoring his/her 
dignity (Marrus, 2007).  
Many German leaders have expressed how the Holocaust made them feel guilty (Barkan, 
2013). For example, the German ambassador to Israel expressed how ashamed he felt for the 
severe violations Nazis committed against the Jewish community (Deseret News, 2000). On 
the other hand, leaders whose states have committed few or light violations feel less guilty. 
For instance, Polish leaders show reluctance in apologizing, as they shift the blame of severe 
war-crimes to their Nazi counterparts (Bloomberg, 2018).  
Therefore, I argue that leaders whose states have committed worse violations will be more 
likely to apologize, as doing so would alleviate their psychological burden (i.e. feelings of 
guilt).4 My first hypothesis thus states: 
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, states that committed worse violations against their 
adversary in a war relative to the violations they suffered are more likely to apologize. 
In the next chapter, I introduce an empirical measure for severity of violations.  
 
                                                          
4 This argument does not consider the causal mechanism linking severe violations with the perpetrator’s feelings of guilt. Future 
research should explore this relationship between severe violations and personal guilt further.  
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    3.2 ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF APOLOGIES 
 
 
One of the benefits of apologizing would be the prospect of trade. Previous research on 
economic interdependence has suggested that states value economic gains, and pursue 
diplomacy aimed at enhancing their trade portfolio (Keohane, 1988). An example of this is 
Yeltsin’s visit to Japan in 1995, where he apologized to Japan for World War II, and then 
discussed the undertaking of trade initiatives (LA Times, 1993).  
The literature on conflict and trade interdependence is vast. This literature on ‘trade promotes 
peace’ maintains that states would not risk trade gains by initiating conflict. Often, political 
conflict is initiated with the intent to coerce the party into providing concessions to the 
initiator (Morrow, 1999). However, bilateral trade makes political conflict undesirable, as 
concessions gained from conflict are less appealing than trade benefits (Gartzke, 2003).  
Similarly, I expect leaders to apologize ex-ante if prospective trade benefits are being 
lowered due to ongoing inter-state conflict. Morrow (1999) discusses how inter-state conflict 
is like a bargaining-situation, where actors risk conflict to receive concessions from the 
other. But, the prospect of trade reduces incentives for conflict, as more is gained from trade 
than playing a costly game (Morrow, 1999). Thus, my second hypothesis states that: 
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, leaders are more likely to apologize when trade lost due 
to hostilities is greater.  
Another indicator of economic prospects would be the victim-state’s economic size. A strong 
economy in the victim-state would incentivize apologizing, as cooperation with victim-state 
might include several material benefits: trade gains, financial and military aid. For example, 
Japan apologized for World War II to U.S in the wake of a new trans-pacific trade deal and 
the promise of military assistance (FP, 2015). My third hypothesis thus states: 
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Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, states are more likely to apologize when victim-state 
has a larger economy. 
In contrast to Hypothesis 3, I expect the perpetrator-state’s economic size to decrease the 
likelihood of an apology. This is because a perpetrator-state with vast economic resources 
would not have a strong incentive to trade with the victim-state. For example, Chinese 
leaders would be less inclined to seek economic cooperation with Turkey, as China already 
dominates the international market. On the other hand, Turkey would be more likely to 
consider Germany for economic cooperation, as Germany lacks economic resources, and is 
more likely to accommodate Turkey’s goal for economic cooperation. Therefore, I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: All else being equal, states with a larger economy are less likely to apologize.  
Although prospects of bilateral trade are strong incentives for apologizing, I argue that they 
are not the only ones. In the next part of this chapter, I discuss how the lack of culpability 
also provides a good incentive for a leader to apologize. Afterwards, I discuss how certain 
ideological characteristics of a leader lower costs of apologizing. Several other benefits and 
costs of apologizing are discussed subsequently. 
I introduce empirical measures for trade lost due to hostilities and economic size in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
 
3.3. LEADER CULPABILITY AND THE DECISION OF APOLOGIZE 
 
 
In recent work, leader culpability has been defined as a leader’s association with an inter-
state war, which risks domestic punishment if the war outcome is unfavorable (Croco, 2011). 
This research is important, as it reveals how leaders can suffer material and reputational costs 
13 
 
for being involved in an unfavorable conflict. Croco (2011) shows that leader culpability can 
lower the chances of re-election for those involved in a losing inter-state war. I argue that 
this research bears implications for inter-state apologies; just like leaders can be punished 
for costly wartime ventures, they can also suffer punishment at home for association with 
war crimes.  
This threat of domestic punishment for culpable leaders introduces what Croco (2011) dubs 
as the “decider’s dilemma”, where culpable leaders wishing to apologize may hold back, 
fearing domestic backlash. For example, Tony Blair faced heavy domestic backlash in UK 
after apologizing for the invasion of Iraq, which he admitted was based on false information 
(The Telegraph, 2015). In addition to losing his reputation, Blair also turned the 
Conservative Party’s reputation unfavorable, which scholars believe pushed voters towards 
anti-EU parties, and thus caused Brexit (Global Research, 2016).  
In addition to reputational and material costs, culpable leaders might also face psychological 
costs. Culpable leaders might experience cognitive dissonance, especially if they find theirs 
or the state’s war crimes as justified. Research on post-conflict societies has shown that 
perpetrators find it difficult to accept their crimes, as their mindset has justified those 
atrocities (Kingma, 2001). For example, Pakistani leaders refuse to apologize to Bangladesh 
for mass atrocities, as they find those justified due to Bengalis involvement with India during 
the war (Huffington Post, 2015).  
In sum, leader culpability introduces psychological, material, and reputational costs for the 
leader, where apologizing for past crimes turns into a burden rather than relief. My fifth 
hypothesis thus states:  
Hypothesis 5: All else being equal, culpable leaders are less likely to apologize for war 
crimes.  
In contrast, I expect non-culpable leaders to apologize for atrocities, as their lack of 
association with such atrocities lowers the likelihood of domestic punishment. Moreover, 
their lack of association with the war-crime reduces guilt and increases likelihood of an 
apology. 
14 
 
Additionally, I argue that a new leadership is more likely to be unassociated with past inter-
state war crimes. This is because new leaders can distance themselves from crimes 
committed by previous ruling-coalitions. Mesquita et al (2004)’s selectorate theory has 
explored how the characteristics of a leader’s ruling-coalition influence his policymaking. 
In my study, I explore whether a leader unassociated with a guilty ruling-coalition is more 
likely to apologize. I conceptualize lack of culpability i.e. no association with a war crime, 
as a leader not being part of the ruling coalition with ties to war crimes. Separately, I test 
this hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: All else being equal, new leaders are more likely to apologize.  
 
 
 
    3.4 LEADER’S IDEOLOGY AND APOLOGIES 
 
 
Controversial policies, such as the policy to continue warring with a state, can incur domestic 
backlash from the public (Croco, 2011). In similar vein, apologizing for war-crimes can also 
be costly for the leader. Moreover, victim-states might find apologies offered by publicly 
accountable leaders as lacking commitment— domestic backlash could compel a leader to 
renege on their inter-state apology. For example, when pressed by the Argentinian media on 
his apology for Falklands war, the then Argentinian leader Carlos Menem retracted his 
statement (BBC, 1998).  
However, I argue that a nationalist leader could evade domestic backlash for apologizing, 
thus increasing his/her incentive for saying sorry. My argument is inspired from the literature 
on the ‘Nixon-goes-to-China-hypothesis’, which states that nationalist leaders enjoy greater 
credibility and can thus proceed with policies deemed controversial by their counterparts 
(Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998). A great example of this is Trump being praised for his 
latest statement on reconciliation with North Korea. As a counterfactual, a similar reaction 
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from a democratic leader may not have been met with a positive response. Thus, if a leader 
can evade domestic backlash, he/she can find it less costly to apologize for past crimes.  
Therefore, I predict that nationalist leaders are more likely to apologize. As such, I test 
whether ideology is related to inter-state apology: 
Hypothesis 7: All else being equal, nationalist leaders are more likely to apologize for war 
crimes.  
However, some research shows that nationalist ideology does not support negative criticism 
of the country. To elaborate, nationalists see their country as without any faults, and find 
past crimes against other countries as either justified or non-existent (Hart, 1999). For 
example, many Japanese nationalist politicians refuse to acknowledge blame for Japan’s 
World War II crimes. These Japanese politicians visit shrines of those accused, and hail them 
as national heroes (The Guardian, 2016). Moreover, several Japanese politicians have called 
for re-writing of national history, so that a pro-Japanese narrative of World War II is 
supported (Lind, 2008) 
This implies that nationalist leaders have a psychological cost associated with apologizing. 
Saying sorry for nationalists means accommodating a world view that their nation is 
imperfect. Due to nationalist ideology’s incompatibility with such views, mental discomfort 
can occur. Thus, I test for this explanation via the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8: All else being equal, nationalist leaders are less likely to apologize for war 
crimes. 
In the next chapter, I discuss the empirical measure I use for leader’s ideology. 
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  3.5 SHARED GEO-POLITICAL PREFERENCES AND APOLOGIES 
 
 
Leaders have political goals, which includes geopolitical preferences for their state. Until 
recently, South Korean leaders feared military threats from North Korea, and permitted U.S 
and UN troops to patrol the border between North and South Korea. Since U.S also 
considered North Korea as a threat, the geopolitical preferences of South Korea and U.S 
aligned and ensured cooperation in this issue.  
Countries with similar preferences often build alliances to achieve their political goals. 
Alliances are an important foreign policy tool, which are used to serve a leader’s political 
agenda. Many scholars from International Relations contend that states build alliances to 
achieve political goals, such as alleviating regional threats5. For example, Israel’s alliance 
with the U.S ensured military assistance during its inter-state wars in the Middle East.  
Similarly, I argue that leaders would apologize if they share similar geopolitical preferences 
with the victim-state. Leaders often promise certain foreign policy goals to their public and 
can face domestic backlash for reneging on them (Fearon, 1994). Given these commitments, 
leaders would realize that material benefits gained from cooperating on foreign policy goals 
would outweigh psychological and reputational costs associated with apologizing. For 
example, Japanese leader Shinzo Abe apologized to U.S for World War II during talks for 
an even closer military alliance, and trade ties via Trans-Pacific Partnership (FP, 2015). This 
is interesting, as Abe has been unapologetic about Japanese war crimes before. Thus, I 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 9: All else being equal, leaders with similar geopolitical preferences are more 
likely to apologize for war crimes 
I introduce an empirical measure for similar geopolitical preferences in the next chapter.  
 
                                                          
5 For a complete discussion on the importance of inter-state alliances, see Palmer and Morgan (2006), p.139-142. 
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    3.6 DOMESTIC TRIALS AND APOLOGIES 
 
 
In extant literature on transitional justice, scholars have argued that justice could either be 
restorative i.e. address grievances of the victim or retributive i.e. punishment for the 
perpetrators. However, recent research has shown that these two components of justice can 
be complementary instead of contradictory (Powers and Proctor, 2017). For instance, Powers 
and Proctor (2017) have shown how countries, which implement transitional justice 
mechanisms are more likely to offer reparations for domestic and international crimes.6 
Since reparations are often preceded by inter-state apologies, I argue that leaders pursuing 
transitional justice are more likely to apologize for inter-state war crimes. For example, 
transitional justice in Germany led to reparations for past crimes, which were then followed 
by many inter-state apologies.   
Domestic trials are a mechanism of transitional justice and are indicative of the leadership’s 
willingness to punish perpetrators. These trials are conducted with the intent to appease 
victims, who wish to see perpetrators held accountable for their crimes. Previous research 
has shown that transitional justice mechanisms, such as trials are often conducted by new 
leadership, which holds perpetrators from the previous regime accountable. Since these 
leaders are interested in holding perpetrators accountable, they might also deem it necessary 
to address grievances of their victims. Leaders pursue transitional justice for numerous 
reasons, such as out of moral obligation and winning international and domestic support. 
The presence of transitional justice mechanisms implies that the new leadership sees this 
process in its interests. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 10: All else being equal, domestic trials increase the likelihood of an inter-state 
apology.  
 
                                                          
6 In their study, Power and Proctor (2017) explored reparations for all human rights’ violations between 1969-2006. This differs 
from my study, as I study apologies for inter-state violations, as listed in Morrow (2006)’s Laws of War dataset. Moreover, my 
study covers a larger temporal domain: 1945-2016, where I explore domestic, state, and systemic factors for inter-state apologies.  
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    3.7 TESTING FOR ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
 
 
So far, my theory of inter-state apologies has focused on leader incentives for apologizing. 
However, the giving of an apology could also be associated with regime-characteristics. 
Proponents of a regime-based explanation include scholars, who offer both normative and 
institutional explanations of regimes (Oneal and Russet, 1993). The extant literature on 
‘democratic peace’ has discussed how democratic norms reduces inter-state conflict. 
Normative explanations of democratic peace contend that democratic regimes are based on 
political norms, which regulate competition through peaceful means (Doyle, 1986) This 
means that for democratic regimes, winning does not require elimination of your opponents. 
Thus, democratic norms allow for a “live and let live” atmosphere. In such an atmosphere, 
democratic regimes might be willing to compromise, and apologize if doing so alleviates 
political conflict, and leads to further cooperation. Thus, my eight hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 11: All else being equal, democratic states are more likely to apologize than 
non-democratic states. 
Proponents of ‘democratic peace’, however believe that democratic norms do not prevent 
conflict between a democratic and an authoritarian state. The argument is that authoritarian 
states are not expected to follow democratic norms, as they follow different ones. Thus, 
democratic peace is only possible between democratic states.  
Hypothesis 12: All else being equal, the likelihood of apologies between jointly democratic 
states increases. 
What about shared cultural and religious characteristics between the perpetrator-state and 
victim-state? Several studies at the individual and group-level show that actors with similar 
beliefs and practices find it easier to forgive each other (Auerbach, 2005; Doosje et al, 2006). 
In contrast, studies on ethno-religious conflicts show that ethnic groups find it easier to target 
and dehumanize groups, which are different from them (Druckman, 1994). Both these 
studies have implications for inter-state relations, as states sharing religious views might find 
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it easier to apologize and forgive each other. This is because states with similar religion as 
the victim would find themselves as members of the same in-group. Several psychological 
studies have explored the concept of an in-group bias, where in-group members view each 
other more favorably (Tajfel, 1982). Moreover, studies in political psychology have shown 
that members are more willing to forgive members of their own in-group (Doosie et al, 
2006). Thus, the psychological cost of apologizing would be reduced when the victim-state 
shares similar religious views. On the other hand, states who have dissimilar religious 
characteristics with the victim-state may consider apologizing as a psychological cost, as 
they would then view the victim-state as an out-group member.  
Hypothesis 13: All else being equal, the likelihood of apologies between states with shared 
religious characteristics increases. 
Scholars have also argued that some cultures are more conducive to democratic norms than 
others (Huntington, 2008). This ‘cultural norms’ argument is related to the argument 
concerning democratic norms, as cultures supporting democracy would be more likely to 
apologize. Unfortunately, I was unable to find data on ‘shared cultural norms’ and was thus 
unable to control for this alternative argument. However, the data on religion was easily 
procured.   
A popular explanation, which dominates the extant literature on political apologies is that 
apologies became more likely in the post-Cold War era. Cunningham (1999) dubs the post-
Cold war era as an era of ‘national self-reflexivity’, when due to rapid democratization and 
spread of human rights’ norms, leaders became more likely to apologize for associated 
crimes (Cunningham, 1999). Examples of leaders apologizing in this era include Bill 
Clinton’s apology for U.S’ slavery, and Trudeau’s apology to Native Indians for past 
mistreatment (Nobles, 2008). Therefore, inter-state apologies should be more likely in the 
post-Cold War era. 
Hypothesis 14: All else being equal, apologies are more likely in the post-Cold War era. 
Some scholars studying the effect of human rights’ norms contend that over time, human 
rights’ norms get internalized by the society, and make states more committed to protecting 
human rights (Risse and Sikkink, 1999). These human rights’ norms are expected to 
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influence state and society following commitments to international human rights’ treaties. 
For instance, Risse and Sikkink (1999) show that many of the basic rights present in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been internalized at the state and domestic 
level and have influenced many states to provide these basic rights. As discussed earlier, the 
extant literature on apologies has also discussed the impact of human rights’ norms on 
political apologies (Cunningham, 1999). Scholars like Cunningham (1999) argue that human 
rights’ norms in democratic states led to self-reflection in many political leaders, thus 
influencing their decision to apologize for past atrocities. The following hypothesis tests this 
human rights’ norm-based explanation for apologies: 
Hypothesis 15: All else being equal, states committed to human rights’ norms should be 
more likely to apologize for war crimes. 
Finally, there are past examples of victors forcibly extracting apologies from those whom 
they defeated in war. An oft-cited case of forced apologies is Germany, which under the 
Versailles treaty, accepted responsibility for World War I (Birdsall, 1962). Known famously 
as the ‘war-guilt clause’, Germany was also forced to pay heavy reparations to France per 
the treaty. Thus, I argue that defeated states should be more likely to apologize to victors for 
inter-state war crimes. My 14th hypothesis thus states: 
Hypothesis 16: All else being equal, defeated states are more likely to apologize for war 
crimes.  
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4. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 
 
The unit of analysis is perpetrator-state-victim-state-year. I identify a perpetrator-state in my 
dataset as the state which committed the war crime. A victim-state is the target of the 
perpetrator-state’s war crime. In my dataset, I only look at apologies offered for inter-state 
war crimes, which are crimes one state committed against another during a war. I have 
obtained the information on inter-state crimes from Morrow (2006)’s dataset on inter-state 
crimes. Morrow (2006)’s dataset lists inter-state crimes for 63 countries, which fought 48 
wars during the years 1900-2000. The inter-state crimes listed in Morrow (2006)’s dataset 
cover nine issue-areas. These are, namely war-crimes against: Civilians, Prisoners of Wars’ 
abuse, Usage of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Aerial Bombing, Damage to Cultural 
Property, Conduct on High Seas, Armistice/Ceasefire, Treatment of Wounded Enemy and 
Declaration of War. I use Morrow (2006)’s dataset as it holds information on specific inter-
state war crimes, which I use to check if a state has offered an apology for a specific war 
crime. Thus, my universe of inter-state apologies is limited to apologies offered for inter-
state war crimes, as presented in Morrow (2006)’s ‘Laws of War’ dataset. 
For each perpetrator-state-victim-state-year dyad, I coded if and when an apology was 
offered by a high-ranking state official. I used data on inter-state war crimes from Morrow 
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(2006)’s dataset to code apologies offered by officials for a specific issue-area, such as POW 
abuse if available. In total, I have 382 perpetrator-state-victim-state-year dyads, which are 
the total number of violations in Morrow’s dataset. Additionally, I also coded attributes of 
each apology offered, such as whether the apology offered was vague or specific in its 
wording. Each attribute of an apology was coded as a dichotomous variable, and the 
attributes measured were: ‘specific vs broad’, ‘clear vs vague’, and whether the apology was 
offered to multiple recipients or just one. I coded specificity of an apology as ‘1’ if the 
apology was offered for a specific war-crime (e.g. POW abuse), and ‘0’ if otherwise. 
Clearness of an apology was coded as ‘1’ if the apology offered was clear i.e. the apology 
included the words ‘I am sorry’ or ‘I apologize’ and coded as ‘0’ if the apology was vague 
or imprecise in its wording. An example of a vague apology would be, “I deeply regret…’. 
If the apology was offered to multiple recipients, I code the multiple-recipients variable as 
‘1’, and ‘0’ otherwise.  
My dataset on ‘Apologies for Inter-State Crimes’ covers the years 1900-2016. However, due 
to missing observations for some key variables, such as Presence of a Nationalist Executive, 
my analysis is limited to years 1945-2016. My baseline model looks at apologies for all inter-
state war violations.  
Additionally, I include an alternative model, which analyzes apologies for inter-state war 
violations against an adversary’s civilians. In Morrow (2006)’s Laws of War dataset, 
violations against civilians in an inter-state war are coded as: mistreatment or killing of non-
combatants i.e. unarmed people by a state. An example of this would be Japan’s bombing of 
Chinese civilians in a World War II raid. I use the alternative model as a robustness check; 
I explore whether my theory of inter-state apology also holds for specific inter-state war 
violations, such as crimes committed against civilians by a perpetrator-state.7   
I have excluded inter-state apologies, which were offered to a state founded after a war (e.g. 
Israel). I have also excluded inter-state apologies not offered by people of high rank or 
authority, such as apologies offered by human rights’ activists. My dataset also excludes 
repeated apologies i.e. apologies offered by a perpetrator repeatedly for an inter-state 
                                                          
7 I could not include models for other specific inter-state war violations, such as POW abuse as Crimes against Civilians was the 
only specific war-crime in Morrow (2006)’s Laws of War dataset with sufficient inter-state apologies for analysis. 
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violation. An example of a repeat apology would be Germany’s apology to France for World 
War II every year after the apology was offered.  
 
 
 
4.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
 
The dependent variable is ‘Apology Offered’, which is binary and is coded as 1 if a 
perpetrator has apologized to the victim in a given year for a specific war-crime; and is coded 
0 otherwise. For example, Germany apologized to France for World War I for declaring war, 
and subsequently for World War II. The dependent variable is coded 1 for the year Germany 
apologized to France for World War I, and for the year Germany apologized to France for 
World War II. Overall, I have coded 20 apologies, which cover roughly 5 percent of inter-
state violations in my dataset.  
 
 
 
4.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 
My information for independent variables comes from existing datasets, which I have 
merged with my dataset on inter-state apologies. Concepts measured by independent 
variables are related to my theory, which posits that leaders of a perpetrator-state compare 
the costs and benefits of apologizing. For instance, some independent variables in my 
dataset measure benefits of apologizing, whereas others measure the costs of apologizing 
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for an inter-state crime.  In addition, I have also included control variables in my dataset, 
which test alternative explanations for inter-state apologies.  
The data on the similarity of geopolitical preferences is obtained from the ‘United Nations 
General Assembly Voting’ dataset (Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017) which measures 
similarity in geopolitical preferences between dyads as s-scores. I use these s-scores to check 
whether similar geopolitical preferences between perpetrator-state and their victim-state 
influence the likelihood of apologizing. 
Trade lost due to hostilities is measured as the gap between actual and potential trade; if the 
gap between actual and potential trade is higher, then trade lost due to hostilities is indicated 
as being high.8 
I use iron and steel production to measure economic power instead of GDP. It has been 
argued that GDP provides only a limited picture of economic power, whereas iron and steel 
production are good predictors of industrial strength. It is costly to produce these goods, but 
countries which have high iron and steel production, show greater industrial strength. 
Moreover, iron and steel production can also be used to make armament, and hence increase 
military power (Kadera et al, 2004). A victim state’s economic size is calculated using iron 
and steel production measures from Correlates of War’s National Capabilities Index 
(CINC).9 To measure the victim state’s economic size, I take a log of CINC’s iron and steel 
production measures. Using this measure, I then test whether the victim’s economic size 
determines the likelihood of an apology from the perpetrator. Similarly, my measure for the 
perpetrator’s economic size, also comes from Correlates of War’s CINC index. From CINC, 
I obtain variables measuring the perpetrator’s iron and steel production and log these 
variables to measure the perpetrator’s overall economic size.  In doing so, I expect to observe 
that the perpetrator-state’s economic size in relation to the victim-state would influence the 
perpetrator’s decision to apologize. 
The data on severe inter-state war-crime violations is obtained from Morrow’s ‘Laws of 
War’ dataset. I create an index variable titled as ‘balance of violations’, which measures the 
                                                          
8 This measure was created based on the gravity equation by my supervisor Prof. Kavakli. 
 
9 The National Capabilities Index is a Correlates of War project, which was created by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972). 
25 
 
severity of violations in each perpetrator-state-victim-state-year dyad. If the perpetrator-state 
has committed worse violations against the victim-state, I code balance of violations as 1. 
But, if the victim-state has committed worse violations against the perpetrator-state, I code 
the balance of violations’ variable as -1. If both states have committed equally severe 
violations against each other, the balance of violations’ variable is coded as 0. After coding 
the balance of violations’ variable separately, I then include this variable in my ‘Inter-State 
Apologies’ dataset. 
Data on the culpability of a leader comes from the ‘Change in Source of Leader Support’ 
(CHISOLS) dataset (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura, 2016). I use data on ruling coalitions, 
and study whether changes in ruling coalition of a state increase the likelihood of apologies. 
Using data on changes in ruling coalitions, leader culpability is measured as a dichotomous 
variable, which is coded as ‘1’ if the leader belongs to the same ruling coalition as the 
perpetrators, and ‘0’ otherwise. Using this measure for ‘leader culpability’, I check whether 
leader involvement or association with inter-state violations reduces the leader’s likelihood 
to apologize. 
The information on whether a leader is nationalist is obtained from the dataset on political 
institutions (2015), which has measures for party affiliation and party ideology. I merge this 
data on party affiliation and party ideology from DPI to my inter-state apologies dataset. The 
data on ideology from DPI is available from the year 1975 onwards. The independent 
variable, which is ‘nationalist ideology’ is dichotomous, and is coded ‘1’ if the leader is 
nationalist, and ‘0’ otherwise. Using this data, I analyze whether leader ideology i.e. leader 
being nationalist influences the leader’s calculus for an apology. 
Lastly, I obtain information on mechanisms of transitional justice from the ‘Victim’s Justice 
in the Aftermath of Conflict’ dataset of Powers and Proctor (2017). I use their information 
on presence of domestic trials in a perpetrator-state to check whether this transitional justice 
mechanism influences the likelihood of an inter-state apology. Powers and Proctor (2017) 
present the presence of domestic trials as a dichotomous variable. This variable is coded 1 if 
domestic trials are conducted in the perpetrator-state, and 0 otherwise.  
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4.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
 
My theory on inter-state apologies posits that leaders weigh the costs and benefits of 
apologizing for inter-state crimes. However, alternative explanations might also account for 
inter-state apologies. I have identified several such alternative explanations for inter-state 
apologies, which I add as control variables in my dataset.  
One alternative explanation as to why states apologize is the presence of democratic norms. 
Scholars have argued that democratic norms regulate cooperation via peaceful means (Oneal 
and Russet, 1993). These norms create an atmosphere where compromise between states is 
possible. As a means of compromise, states might apologize for past crimes. Scholars 
studying democratic peace have argued that these norms only apply to democratic countries, 
as they expect each other to compete in a peaceful manner (Doyle, 1986). Similarly, it can 
be argued that democracies would be more likely to apologize. To test this explanation, I 
find it conducive to use data on regimes from Polity-IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007) as it is 
readily available. Polity-IV is a comprehensive data on regimes and regime-change and 
includes several measures for a country’s regime i.e. whether a country is democratic or 
authoritarian. After merging data on regimes and regime change from Polity-IV, I create 
dichotomous indicators for a country’s democracy and joint democracy between the 
perpetrator-state and victim-state. I code a country as 1 if its democratic and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, I code dyads as 1 if the dyad is ‘jointly democratic’ and 0 if they are not. 
Shared religion and cultural norms can also be considered as variables, which influence the 
leader’s decision to apologize. Scholars have shown that members of a group act more 
favorably towards people with similar characteristics as their group (Doosje et al, 2006; 
Tajfel, 1982). Similarly, it can be argued that states with similar religious and cultural 
characteristics as the victim-state would find it easier to apologize. While I could not find a 
reliable measure for cultural norms, I was able to obtain data on religion from the 
comprehensive ‘Dataset on Religious Characteristics’ (Davis and James, 2015). This dataset 
on religious characteristics includes variables measuring religious composition of a country 
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from circa. 1700 until 2015. Since my dataset covers only the years 1900-2017, I obtain 
religion data for those years, and merge this religion data with my dataset on inter-state 
apologies. Using this religion data, I create a dichotomous variable ‘shared religion’, which 
is coded as 1 if the perpetrator-state and victim-state have similar religion, and 0 otherwise.  
Another alternative explanation as to why states apologize is that states apologize to victors 
after war, as victors can force losers to accept guilt. An oft-cited example is Germany after 
World War I, which was forced to apologize and pay reparations to France. I account for this 
alternative explanation by including a ‘defeated’ dummy, which is coded 1 if a state is 
defeated in an inter-state war and 0 otherwise. I obtain data on whether a country is defeated 
in a war from Correlates of War’s Inter-State War dataset. Unfortunately, due to data 
limitations, I am unable to test whether defeated states are more likely to apologize. 
I also control for the effect of human rights’ norms on inter-state apologies. I measure a 
state’s commitment to human rights’ norms by checking how many human rights’ treaties a 
state has ratified. The argument is that if a state has ratified more than one human rights’ 
treaty, then the state is more committed to preserving human rights’ norms. This would imply 
that human rights’ norms have been internalized in these states, making them more likely to 
apologize for human rights’ violations.  
Nielsen and Simmons (2014) have argued that four human rights’ agreements form the core 
of the multilateral legal apparatus. These four human rights’ agreements are, namely: The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the First Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OP 1), the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT), and the optional 22nd Article of the Convention Against Torture (Nielsen and 
Simmons, 2014). I obtained data on all four treaties from United Nation’s Office of High 
Commissioner’s website. However, data on 22nd Article of CAT was included in the original 
CAT treaty. As a result, I had four treaties reduced to three. I then merged this data with my 
Inter-State Apologies dataset. If a country had ratified any of these human rights treaties, I 
code 1 for the ratification of that specific human rights treaty; 0 otherwise. Additionally, my 
dataset includes a variable, which holds information on whether a country has signed all 
three human rights’ treaties. If a country has signed all three human rights treaties, I code 
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the variable 3. But, if the country has signed only one or two treaties, I code them as 1 and 
2 respectively. 
I also check the effect of time after an inter-state violation on the likelihood of an inter-state 
apology. I create a logged version of ‘time’ using information on years in my panel dataset. 
I then create a variable ‘time since last inter-state war violation’, which is continuous and 
measures how much time has passed since the last inter-state war violation. Previous 
research is yet to discuss whether and how the passage of time influences a perpetrator-
state’s decision to apologize. My inclusion of ‘time since last inter-state war violation’ is to 
open scholarly discussion on the timing of an apology for the perpetrator-state.  
Lastly, I check whether systemic variables, such as the presence of Cold War affect the 
likelihood of apologies. In other words, I check whether more apologies are offered in one 
era, such as Cold War, as opposed to other eras, such as post-Cold War. My dataset includes 
a Cold-War dummy, which is coded as 1 during Cold War years i.e. between 1945 and 1989, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
4.4 METHODS 
 
 
I use the Logit-based estimator for my study, as my dependent variable ‘Apology Offered’ 
is dichotomous in nature; 1 if an apology is offered and 0 if not. 
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5.  RESULTS 
 
 
 
Table 1. Determinants of Inter-State Apologies for War Crimes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Post-1945 
All 
Violations 
Post-1945 
Viol’s 
against 
Civilians 
Post-1990 
All 
Violations 
Post-1990 
Viol’s 
against 
Civilians 
     
Time since 
Leadership 
Transition in 
Perpetrator 
-0.0206 
(-0.37) 
-0.138* 
(-1.75) 
-0.0821* 
(-1.66) 
-0.218** 
(-2.20) 
 
     
Time since 
Leadership 
Transition in Victim 
-0.00266 
(-0.07) 
0.0526 
(1.06) 
-0.0586 
(-0.77) 
-0.0980 
(-1.09) 
 
     
Changes in Ruling 
Coalition in 
Perpetrator 
0.0227 
(0.55) 
0.0565* 
(1.68) 
0.0100 
(0.20) 
0.0463 
(1.27) 
 
     
Non-Culpable 
Perpetrator 
1.352 
(1.07) 
3.607* 
(1.95) 
0.844 
(0.74) 
3.079 
(1.17) 
 
     
Non-Culpable 
Victim 
-1.053 
(-0.94) 
0.770 
(0.48) 
-0.0261 
(-0.01) 
0.916 
(0.15) 
 
     
Presence of 
Nationalist 
Executive in 
Perpetrator 
  3.216* 
(1.86) 
2.052 
(0.34) 
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Balance of 
Violations 
1.183* 
(1.71) 
2.850** 
(2.98) 
0.964 
(0.92) 
  6.773** 
(2.12) 
 
     
Perpetrator’s Iron 
and Steel Prod. 
0.206 
(1.04) 
0.941** 
(2.20) 
0.239 
(1.45) 
1.741* 
(1.79) 
 
     
Victim’s Iron and 
Steel Prod. 
0.198 
(1.36) 
0.774** 
(2.54) 
0.141 
(0.63) 
  1.177** 
(2.34) 
 
     
     
Shared Geopolitical 
Preferences 
0.747 
(1.31) 
1.078 
(1.14) 
1.112 
(1.46) 
  2.995** 
(2.30) 
 
     
Trade Lost Due to 
Hostilities 
-0.0314 
(-0.20) 
-0.247 
(-1.38) 
0.0122 
(0.04) 
-0.162 
(-0.28) 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Post-1945 
All 
Violations 
Post-1945 
Viol’s 
against 
Civilians 
Post-1990 
All 
Violations 
Post-1990 
Viol’s 
against 
Civilians 
     
Presence of 
Domestic Trials in 
Perpetrator 
 
 
 
 
0.794 
(0.54) 
0.190 
(0.16) 
 
     
Shared Religious 
Characteristics 
-0.956 
(-1.17) 
-1.916 
 (-1.58) 
-1.007 
(-1.04) 
-4.887 
      (-1.21) 
 
     
Cold War   4.223**  4.703** 0.0100 0.0463 
 
 
(3.51) (2.41) (0.20) (1.27) 
     
Democratic 
Perpetrator x 
Democratic Victim 
 3.063 
(1.38) 
  2.889 
 (0.98) 
  16.32** 
 (6.63) 
  20.81** 
      (3.19) 
 
 
Time Since Last 
Violation 
  -0.0514 
  (-1.12) 
    -0.160** 
  (-2.54) 
-0.0262 
 (-0.66) 
   -0.180* 
   (-1.86) 
 
 
Constant    -11.14**      -24.88**   -6.707**    -31.48** 
   (-4.40)    (-4.68)   (-2.89)       (-2.69) 
 
N 11763 11562 3809 3714 
     
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 
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5.1 FINDINGS  
 
 
Table 1 shows the results of the regression analysis, where I investigate which factors 
influence inter-state apologies. Each model represents a particular time-period; Models 1 
and 2 observe the effect on apologies for post-1945 era; Models 3 and 4 display the effect 
on apologies for the post-1990 era. As a robustness check, I also limit Models 2 and 4 inter-
state violations against civilians and observe the effect on apologies in those models. 
Most of my hypotheses on leader incentives find strong support in models limited to civilian 
inter-state crimes. As shown in Table 1, most of the domestic factors, such as time since last 
leadership transition, changes in ruling coalition over time and balance of violations are all 
significant for civilian inter-state violations. Time since last Leadership Transition in 
Perpetrator, however, is significant for both violations against civilians and all inter-state 
violations. Only the Presence of a Nationalist Executive in Perpetrator is significant for all 
inter-state violations, but not for those against civilians.  
Time since Last Leadership Transition in Perpetrator is a continuous variable and decreases 
the likelihood of apologies. This variable has a strong and negative effect on apologies 
offered in post-1990s for inter-state violations against civilians (Models 2 and 4). For all 
inter-state violations, Time since Last Leadership Transition in Perpetrator is only 
significant in the post-1990s era (Model 3). This relationship between Time since Last 
Leadership Transition in Perpetrator and inter-state apology is weaker in all cases of inter-
state violations i.e. Model 3. Overall, these results support my hypothesis, which posits that 
late leaders in office would have little incentive to apologize for inter-state violations.  For 
example, Putin apologized for Katyn Massacre in his earlier years in office but stopped 
apologizing afterwards. Thus, the coefficient is negative; as more time passes since a 
leadership transition, the likelihood of apologies decreases.  
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The independent variable measuring Changes in Ruling Coalition in Perpetrator is positive, 
but only for inter-state violations against civilians in post-1945 era (Model 2). This indicates 
that as ruling-coalitions change over time, the likelihood of inter-state apologies increases. I 
use this measure of ruling-coalition transitions in my analysis to create an indicator of 
culpability i.e. association with an inter-state violation. A non-culpable leader does not 
belong to a ruling coalition associated with an inter-state violation. My measure of leader 
non-culpability, which is dichotomous is also positive and significant in Model 2. This 
relationship between leader non-culpability and inter-state apologies is strong. Thus, I find 
some support for my hypothesis, which states that leaders not associated with an inter-state 
violation are more likely to apologize. A good example of this finding is Yeltsin’s apologies 
to Japan for World War II. Yeltsin’s leadership came after the collapse of the Soviet regime, 
which had been blamed from World War II war crimes. Thus, Yeltsin was able to apologize 
without bearing accountability to war crimes of Soviet regime.  
The Presence of a Nationalist Executive in Perpetrator is only significant in Model 3, where 
the effect on apologies is observed for all inter-state violations in post-1990s era. This is a 
dichotomous variable, which indicates a nationalist executive as 1. The coefficient for 
Presence of National Executive in Perpetrator is positive and indicates that the presence of 
a nationalist executive increases the likelihood of an inter-state apology. Here, I find support 
for my ‘Nixon-goes-to-China’ hypothesis, which states that nationalist leaders are more 
likely to apologize. The argument here is that nationalist leaders enjoy greater credibility, as 
they are perceived as hawks who make tough, but right choices (Cuckierman and Tommasi, 
1998). A recent example is that of Shinzo Abe, who apologized in front of U.S congress for 
World War II last year. Apologies by previous leaders resulted in domestic backlash in Japan 
(Lind, 2008). However, Abe as a nationalist leader was praised by critics back home for 
giving a general apology, which did not link Japan to severe crimes like Pearl Harbor (DW, 
2016).  
A fairly robust finding is that Balance of Violations increases the likelihood of apologies. 
This variable is significant in three specifications of my analysis: Model 1, 2 and 4. My 
Balance of Violations variable takes three values: -1, 0 and 1, where 1 indicates that the 
perpetrator-state has committed several severe violations against the victim-state. Thus, an 
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increase in balance of violations shows that worse perpetrator-states are more likely to 
apologize. The regression coefficient for Balance of Violations is larger for cases of inter-
state violations against civilians (refer to Figure 1). Interestingly, the coefficient for Balance 
of Violations gets larger in post-1990s for civilian inter-state violations and is significant. 
This indicates that worse perpetrator-states were more likely to apologize in post-1990s era. 
My first hypothesis finds support, as it stated that leaders of states which commit severe 
violations are more likely to apologize. This finding is also supported by numerous examples 
of German leaders, such as Willy Brandt apologizing for severe crimes (e.g. Holocaust).  
Additionally, I calculated average marginal effects of the variables: Balance of Violations 
and Time since Last Leadership Transition in Perpetrator on Inter-State Apology for Model 
4 i.e. Violations against Civilians in post-1990s:  
 
Figure 1: Average Marginal Effects of Balance of Violations 
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Figure 2: Average Marginal Effects of Time since Last Leadership Transition  
 
Figures 1 and 2 show that the substantive effects of Balance of Violations and Time since 
Last Leadership Transition in Perpetrator on Inter-State Apology are small, but statistically 
significant in some cases. 
Turning to my economic variables:  The Perpetrator and Victim-State’s Iron and Steel 
Production are also positively related to inter-state apologies but are statistically significant 
for only violations against civilians (Models 2 and 4). Note that the effect of these variables 
gets stronger in the post-1990s era (see Figure 1). My third hypothesis, which suggested that 
perpetrator-states are more likely to apologize if victim-state’s economy is larger, finds 
support here. Surprisingly, my second hypothesis is not supported, as I expected a 
perpetrator-state’s iron and steel production to be negatively associated with the likelihood 
of an apology. The sign is positive and indicates that this variable increases the likelihood of 
an apology. My theory is unable to account for this finding. 
I also find that Shared Geopolitical Preferences increase the likelihood of an apology but 
achieve statistical significance in the post-1990s era for inter-state violations against 
civilians (Model 4). This provides some evidence for my hypothesis, which suggests that 
leaders with shared geopolitical preferences are more likely to apologize. 
Two domestic factors: Presence of Domestic Trials in Perpetrator and Trade Lost due to 
Hostilities are unrelated to apologies. Presence of Domestic Trials in Perpetrator is 
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insignificant across all four models in my regression analysis (see Fig.1). Thus, my 
hypothesis that presence of domestic trials would increase likelihood of an apology is 
unsupported. Similarly, I find that prospects of trade, as indicated by Trade Lost Due to 
Hostilities is insignificant in my analysis. 
Most of my control variables also find empirical support. This shows that state and systemic 
variables also effect the likelihood of apologizing. The only control variable unsupported in 
my analysis is Shared Religious Preferences. Shared Religious Preferences receives no 
statistical significance across all four models. In addition to being insignificant, Shared 
Religious Preferences also has the wrong sign. I had expected Shared Religious Preferences 
to have a positive effect on apologies. Instead, shared religious preferences seems to lower 
the chances of apologizing. Neither my theory nor does the extant literature accounts for this 
finding. 
I find that the presence of Cold War increased the likelihood of an apology. This finding is 
statistically significant for all inter-state violations and cases limited to violations against 
civilians (Models 1 and 2). This challenges the extant literature on apologies, which posited 
that apologies were more likely in the post-Cold War era. The coefficient for Cold War is 
large and is positively related to apologies. In the next chapter, I discuss why my empirical 
finding contradicts the hypothesis, which states that apologies were more forthcoming after 
Cold War. 
Some support is present for human rights’ norms increasing the likelihood of an apology. I 
account for human rights’ norms by testing whether countries with more ratified human 
rights’ treaties are more likely to apologize. My results show that Ratification of Human 
Right’s Treaties by Perpetrator increase the likelihood of apology, but only for civilian inter-
state violations in the post 1990s. (Model 4). While the effect of human rights treaties is not 
significant in other specifications, I find it interesting that Ratification of Human Right’s 
Treaties by Perpetrator has the wrong sign in those specifications.   
Regime-based variables also enjoy some support in my analysis. I include an interaction 
term, which measures the joint effect of Democratic Perpetrator and Democratic Victim-
State on the likelihood of apologizing. The components of this interaction term are two 
dichotomous variables; one identifies whether the perpetrator-state is a democracy, and the 
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other checks whether the victim-state is a democracy. My findings show that a democratic 
perpetrator-state is less likely to apologize when the victim-state is undemocratic. Similarly, 
the likelihood of apology decreases when the victim-state is democratic, and the perpetrator-
state is not. 
Lastly, I find that Time Since Last Violation decreases the likelihood of an apology, but only 
for inter-state violations against civilians (Models 2 and 4). This is a continuous variable, 
which indicates how much time has passed since the perpetrator-state last committed an 
inter-state war violation. My finding thus shows that as more time passes after the last inter-
state violation, apologies becomes less likely for violations against civilians. 
 
 
 
5.2 LIMITATIONS 
 
 
My analysis of the effects on inter-state apologies suffers from several limitations. This is 
because I have a small sample size for my dependent variable (N=20), which leads to the 
separation problem in my regression model. Briefly, separation effect occurs when an 
independent variable perfectly predicts the outcome, and thus fails to capture any variation 
on the dependent variable. As a result, I am unable to explore the effects of a few key 
variables, such as Defeat of Perpetrator-State, Defeat of Victim-State and Joint IGO 
Membership, which get omitted because of the separation effect. Several other variables, 
such as Presence of Reparations, Amnesty and Presence of Militarized Inter-State Disputes 
are also omitted, which prevents me from exploring their effects on inter-state apologies. 
Moreover, I have missing values for many of my independent variables, which fail to capture 
variation for the likelihood of apologies. For example, Trade lost due to Hostilities has 
several missing values, as I do not have trade data for the years 1900-1960. Similarly, I have 
missing observations for my Presence of Nationalist Executive in Perpetrator variable, 
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which includes observations from 1975 onwards. Missing values in nationalist executive 
explain why results for its effect on apologies is only limited to post-1990 era, as only inter-
state apologies after 1990 are being explained. Initially, I had planned to study inter-state 
apologies for the entire period 1900-2016. However, due to missing observations for many 
independent variables, I had my analysis reduced to 1945-2016. As a result, important cases, 
such as Germany’s apology to France for World War I got excluded from my statistical 
analysis. 
Despite these limitations, I argue that conducting a systematic study of inter-state apologies 
was necessary, as my study explored a more comprehensive list of inter-state apologies than 
before. Also, I am able to test multiple explanations of apologies in addition to my own 
theory. My findings greatly reduce the multiplicity of explanations by revealing which 
explanations are relevant for when and why states apologize. In doing so, I show why, when, 
and how domestic, state, and systemic variables increase the likelihood of an inter-state 
apology.  
I summarize and discuss the implications of my contributions in the final chapter.  
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
 
My thesis shows that states weigh the benefits and costs of apologizing for an inter-state war 
crime. I find that domestic factors, such as a leader’s ideology and his/her lack of 
involvement with a war crime increase the likelihood of an inter-state apology. My strongest 
finding is that states who commit worse violations against the other are more likely to 
apologize. This finding indicates the presence of psychological costs (i.e. feelings of guilt), 
as states with worse violations alleviate their psychological burden by apologizing.  
This study has also revealed the value of investigating several benefits and costs associated 
with inter-state apologies. In doing so, I find which factors reduce costs, and enlarge 
potential benefits of an inter-state apology. I find that non-culpability i.e. being unrelated to 
an inter-state war crime reduces psychological and reputational costs of apologizing. Shared 
geopolitical preferences also reduce the costs of apologizing, as they promise inter-state 
cooperation, which helps leaders achieve political goals. On the other hand, a victim-state’s 
larger economy increases prospective benefits of an inter-state apology, as perpetrator-states 
expect material benefits, such as alliances from reconciliation with the victim-state.  
My study also reveals domestic factors which are not related to inter-state apologies. Neither 
the promise of bilateral trade nor does the presence of domestic trials explains why states 
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apologize. This opens an avenue for exploring why some incentives are unattractive for 
apologies. Future research should investigate why the prospect of trade does not account for 
inter-state apology. Note however that I had missing observations for bilateral trade, which 
makes this finding unsubstantiated. More data is required to explore the effect of trade 
prospects on apologizing.  Scholars should also investigate whether additional transitional 
mechanisms, such as reparations influence a state’s decision to apologize. Additionally, 
future research should also investigate whether international trials influence inter-state 
apologies. 
Overall, this research has demonstrated the importance of conducting a quantitative analysis. 
In addition to my own theory, I was able to test alternative explanations for inter-state 
apologies. A major claim in the literature was that apologies were a post-Cold War 
phenomenon. My study contradicted this claim, as I showed that inter-state apologies were 
more likely during Cold War. Why could this be the case? Previously, political apologies 
had not been classified into inter-state and intra-state apologies. Thus, it could be the case 
that intrastate apologies were more likely after Cold War. Therefore, future research should 
investigate intrastate apologies separately. 
I do not claim to have uncovered all the determinants of an inter-state apology: there is a lot 
of room left for future research. Some of my findings invoke questions, which require further 
investigation. For example, I find that as time passes after an inter-state war crime, the 
perpetrator-state is less likely to apologize. To my knowledge, no study has explored the 
effect of timing on an inter-state apology. Therefore, future work should also investigate the 
effect of timing on a perpetrator-state’s decision to apologize.   
Finally, my study also opens an avenue for exploring which kinds of violations receive 
apologies. Interestingly, my theory of inter-state apologies found more empirical support in 
cases limited to civilian inter-state war crimes. Future research should investigate why 
leaders are more likely to apologize for some inter-state war crimes, but not others.  
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